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Abstract: The nation's most impoitant computer crime
statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
("CFAA"), has made its way into the employment
relationship. This has generated a surge of academic alarm
and more than a few confused courts. The legal quandary,
however, comes down to a single word: "authorization."
What does it mean to have it? When does an employee lose
it? And why should it matter if she does? Behind the term of
art rests two lines of interpretation. While some courts have
interpreted "authorization" narrowly, by equating it with
physical access, others have employed a broad
interpretation, drawing the fault lines along the doctrines of
contract and agency law. Commentators have constructed
a number of arguments to support each interpretation, but
most have urged the adoption of a narrow interpretation of
authorization. This article argues that this narrow
approach is imprudent and misguided and that a broad
interpretation focusing upon the intent of an employee
targets the greater threat and comports with policy and
congressional intent. Such an approach should be adopted
via statutory amendment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although originally designed to protect against computer hackers,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA"),2 the primary
federal computer crime law, has found its way into the realm of
employment law in the past decade as a means for employers to
protect sensitive business resources from rogue employees.3 Its
applicability in this context, however, has generated scholarly debate
and a circuit split.4 The controversy is rooted in the statutory text: The
CFAA prohibits what it deems unauthorized access to computers. The
term "authorization," however, is undefined. In attempting to
interpret it, courts have generally employed two distinct approaches.
While some courts have defined "authorization" as a term of art
rooted in agency or contract law, viewing unauthorized access as a
question of the employee's intent,5 others, in a recent trend, have
utilized a narrower definition, examining whether the employer
actually had granted the employee technical access to a resource by,
for example, providing the employee with a username and password
to access a particular database. 6
z 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
3 See Pac. Aerospace & Elecs. Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003)
("Employers ... are increasingly taking advantage of the CFAA's civil remedies to sue
former employees and their new companies who seek a competitive edge through wrongful
use of information from the former employer's computer system."); Orin Kerr, Vagueness
Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN L. REV. 1561, 1583 (2010) ("In
the last five years, cases applying the CFAA to allegedly disloyal employees have become by
far the most common type of CFAA case."). Some have referred to the statute as "by far the
most important and influential computer misuse statute in the United States, if not
throughout the world." Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and
Privacy, 62 Bus. LAW. 1395, 1402 (2007).
4 See Nick Akerman, Will SCOTUS Rule on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act?, Sept. 24,
2009, NAT'L L.J., available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202434043364. Several courts of appeals have reached
incompatible conclusions. A number of district courts have disagreed with the agency
theory approach discussed infra. See, e.g., Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 54o F.
Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
5 See, e.g., Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). In addition to the
Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit, see EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577
(1st Cir. 2007), and the Fifth Circuit, see United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010),
generally follow this interpretation of authority.
6 See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
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This article examines the role and application of the CFAA in the
employment context, specifically as used against rogue employees.
Moreover, this article offers a resolution of a pressing legal question:
In the context of a private cause of action against a rogue employee,
how should courts determine when conduct is "authorized" pursuant
to the CFAA? Part II presents an overview of why the issue deserves
attention and prompt resolution. This overview includes an overview
of the CFAA's original purpose, subsequent amendments, and current
statutory structure. Part III examines the use of the CFAA in the
employment context. Two diverging interpretations of "authorization"
are presented. Part IV reviews pertinent scholarly commentary. Part V
is a critical appraisal of the countervailing interpretations. An
interpretation of authorization focusing on employees' intent is
advocated as better serving the needs of the employment relationship.
Part VI concludes by suggesting legislative action as the preferred
means by which to resolve the debate.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1986
A. THE PROBLEM IN 2011
The issue of what constitutes authorization warrants consideration
and resolution because a lingering circuit split has left the law in this
area unsettled in a number of jurisdictions. Compounding this
concern is the increased prevalence of internal data theft. A February
2009 study by the Ponemon Institute, a privacy and management
research firm, examined data loss risk during downsizing and found
that 59% of employees who leave or are asked to leave steal company
data.7 Moreover, 79% of these employees said their former employer
did not permit them to leave with company data.8 Finally, 67% of
these respondents said they used their former employer's confidential,
sensitive, or proprietary information to leverage a new job.9 A large-
7 Data Loss Risks During Downsizing, Ponemon Institute, Feb. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/Data%2OLoss%20
Risks%2oDuring%2oDownsizing%2oFINAL%201.pdf. Kevin Rowney, founder of the Data
Loss Prevention arm of security firm Symantec, the study's sponsor, further noted that
there would be a "surging wave" of such insider theft. Maggie Shiels, Workers 'stealing
company data,' BBC News, Feb. 23, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/79o2989.stm.
8 Data Loss Risks During Downsizing, supra note 7.
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scale data breach investigations report conducted by Verizon Business
also found that insider breaches accounted for 18% of attacks, with the
remainder coming from outside the firm.1° Though the insider
breaches were fewer in number than those caused by external sources,
when they did occur, they were much larger than those caused by
outsiders.11
These figures raise additional concerns in light of the current
factual context. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in
October 2003 55.5% of the total workforce-approximately 77 million
persons-used a computer at work.12 Moreover, the economic
downturn, which began in 2008, has led to significant reductions in
the national workforce across many industries.13 The law regarding
information theft and destruction by rogue employees is likely to be
utilized in a new wave of potential claims, as insider breaches are on
the rise and expected to increase. 14 The malicious insider is one of the
10 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK Team, available at
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/databreachreport.pdf.
11 Id. A supplement to the report further noted "breaches involving insider abuse often
occur after the employee is terminated or notified of termination. 2009 Data Breach
Investigations Supplemental Report, Verizon Business RISK Team, available at
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/rp-2009-data-breach-
investigations-supplemental-report-en-xg.pdf For an interesting account of how security
and data protection are viewed as a strategic business priority for management, see
Business Case for Date Protection: A Study of CEOs and Other C-Level Executives in the
United Kingdom, Ponemon Institute, Mar. 201o, available at
https://wwwl4.software.ibm.com/iwm/web/cc/imc/rational/papers/BusinessCase for
Data ProtectionUK.pdf. (finding that C-level executives believe prudent data protection
practices can support key organizational goals such as compliance, reputation
management, and consumer trust).
12 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Computer and Internet Use at Work in 2003, at 1
(2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ciuaw.nro.htm. Presumably, this
figure has increased in recent years.
13 At the time of this writing, the unemployment rate has hovered between nine percent
and ten percent. See Motoko Rich, Adding Jobs, but Not Many, U.S. Economy Seems to
Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/lo/o8/business/economy/us-adds-103000-jobs-rate-
steady-at-9-1.html?_r= 1&scp=3&sq=unemployment%2orate&st=cse (noting that the
economy is not growing fast enough to bring down the unemployment rate, "which held
steady at 9.1 percent ... ").
14 See Maggie Shiels, Malicious insider attacks to rise, BBC News, February 11, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/78759o4.stm (reporting that
Microsoft, the world's largest software maker, has warned companies to expect an increase
in insider security attacks by disgruntled, laid-off workers).
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most significant threats companies face because the malicious insider
has relatively easy access to a company's most valuable assets and
know exactly where to find them. I5 In contrast, outsiders, such as
hackers, must conduct a fishing expedition to accomplish the same
thing. The available data seem to suggest that public and private
actors have mistakenly devoted their attention to thwarting allegedly
sophisticated and menacing outsiders, when the greater threat lurks
within businesses themselves. 16
B. THE PROBLEM TN 1984
Before 1984, there was no specific federal legislation in the area of
computer crime. 17 Enforcement against computer-related crime was
pursued under statutes designed to prosecute other offenses. 18 This
changed in 1984 with the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CADCFAA"), a provision of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act intended to address the unauthorized access and
15 See id. (quoting Doug Leland, a Microsoft Identity and Security Unit manager); see also
First Annual Cost of Cybererime Study: Benchmark Study of U.S. Companies, Ponemon
Institute, July 201o, available at http://www.arcsight.com/library/download/ponemon-
20lO-cost-of-cyber-crime-study (finding that information theft constitutes the highest
external cost of cybercrime, and that malicious insiders account for a substantial measure
of eyber attacks). The Cybercrime study found that 62% of U.S. firms surveyed had
experienced attacks relating to malicious insiders, and that such insiders constituted the
second highest average annualized cybercrime cost weighted by the frequency of attack
incidents (viruses and worms constituted the highest). Id. Finally of note, attacks by
malicious insiders took, on average across the firms surveyed, 30.4 days to resolve. Only
malicious code attacks took longer to resolve (39.3 days). Id.
,6 See Shiels, supra note 14 (quoting Kevin Rowney of Semantec: "The outstanding,
unsolved, unaddressed risk management problem that has existed for years is that
everyone is focusing on the hacker[.] It feels more sexy and interesting to fend against the
assailant from the outside rather than face the possibility that the guy in the next cubicle is
ripping off corporate data.").
17 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3691-92. Note,
however, that all 50 states have some sort of computer crime legislation. Some state
legislatures enacted these statutes before the federal computer crime law. Florida passed
the first. Vermont passed the last. See Orin Kerr, Cbercrime's Scope: Interpreting
"Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1616
(2003).
'
8 See id. (noting the use of the mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343)
statutes).
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use of computers and computer networks.19 Citing the technological
transformation over the past 25 years and the integration of the
computer into everyday lives, and as a critical component of national
defense, financial transactions, and information transmission, the
1984 House Report supporting passage of the CADCFAA noted that
"traditional theft/larceny statutes are not the proper vehicle to control
the spate of computer abuse and computer assisted crimes. '"2o
Furthermore, the report found that the proliferation of computer
networking since the 197os had permitted hackers to access both
private and public computer systems, with potentially serious
results.21 The report referenced the 1983 film, WarGames, in which
Matthew Broderick played a computer hacker who infiltrates a
confidential government system, gains complete control over the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, and nearly causes a large-scale nuclear war.22 The
CADCFAA was introduced on the floor of Congress only months after
the film's release.23 Thus, it seems clear that hacking, and related
computer misuse, served as a key impetus for the first federal
computer crime statute.24
The legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress
mostly saw the 1984 Act as doing for computers what trespass and
burglary laws did for real property.25 The statute essentially functions
19 See Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual, United States Department of Justice,
February 2007, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ccmanual/ccmanual.pdf.
20 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694-95.
21 1d.
22 WarGames (MGM/UA Studios 1983).
23 See Joseph M. Olivenbaum, CTRL-ALT-DELETE: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 574, 596 (1997) (noting that the House Report
"'specifically referred to testimony describing War Games as a 'realistic representation of
the automatic dialing and access capabilities of the personal computer,' and thus,
apparently, of the threat to computer security presented by those capabilities").
24 Professor Kerr provides a useful dichotomy. The umbrella of computer crime can be
divided into two types of substantive offenses: traditional crimes using computers, such as
an online death threat, and crimes of computer misuse, such as hacking. Kerr, supra note
17, at 1602-05.
2 5 See id. at 1617. The concept of trespass in cyberspace invokes a preliminary inquiry of
whether a website or server should be deemed property. This is a contested theoretical
issue that is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of this article, it may be
assumed that Congress considered the activities of computer hackers to be akin to trespass,
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like a federal claim for trespass2 6 by prohibiting certain conduct
involving unauthorized access to a computer system. The 1984 Act
performed this function by prohibiting unauthorized access in three
narrow areas. 27 Subsection 1030(a)(1) made it a felony to knowingly
access a computer without authorization, or in excess of authorization,
in order to obtain classified United States defense or foreign relations
information.28 Subsection 103o(a)(2) made it a misdemeanor to
knowingly access a computer without authorization, or in excess of
authorization, in order to obtain information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution or in a consumer file of a consumer-
reporting agency.2 9 Finally, subsection 103o(a)(3) made it a
misdemeanor to knowingly access a computer without authorization,
or in excess of authorization, in order to compromise or affect the
government's use of the computer.30 These narrow proscriptions only
protected certain types of computer systems and select types of
information on those systems.3' Congress believed that such computer
see tH.R. REP. NO. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3695 (". . • so-
called 'hackers' who have been able to access (trespass into) both private and public
computer system..."), and the relevant digital information to be considered property, see
S. REP. No. 99-432, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2491 (recognizing
the "necessity that computerized information be considered 'property' for purposes of
Federal criminal law"). For commentary challenging the metaphor of the Internet as a
.'place" and thus warranting property-based rules, see, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as
Place and the Tragedy of the DigitalAnticommons, 91 CAL. L. RE\,. 439 (2003); Mark A.
Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003).
26 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access: Contract,
Trespass, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 295,
308 (2002).
27 See Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REv. 453, 460 (1990).
28 See id. at 461-62 (citing Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2008)).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 The 1984 Act applied to "federal interest computers." This term was defined as a
computer exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government,
or in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense
affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government. See Christine D.
Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control
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systems needed special protection because they contained the most
sensitive types of information, particularly classified information,
financial records, and credit histories.32
C. SUBSEQUENT EXPANSION OF THE ACT
Despite a fairly broad focus (i.e., computer crime), the 1984 Act
was narrow in scope.33 Instead of amending every statute affected by
advances in computer technology, Congress chose to address the
subject in a single statute but was reluctant to preempt or interfere
with local and state computer crime authorities.34 In addition to this
deficiency, the statute was also criticized as being overly vague,
incomplete, structurally flawed, and difficult to use.35 In light of these
shortcomings, Congress continued to investigate the problems
associated with computer crime to determine if further revision was
necessary.36 Throughout 1985, congressional hearings were held
focusing on the appropriate scope of federal jurisdiction in the area of
computer crime. Although it was proposed, Congress declined to enact
"as sweeping a federal statute as possible so that no computer crime is
potentially uncovered."37 The preferred approach, rather, was to limit
federal jurisdiction over computer crime to cases presenting a
compelling federal interest-where computers of the Federal
Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 327-28 (2004)
(citing S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4 (1996)).
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes &Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 912 (2003); Griffith, supra note 27, at 466-74
(noting grievances and recommendations to the Act from multiple parties, including
legislators, analysts, and state and federal law enforcement officials); see also Charlotte
Decker, Cyber Crime 2.o: An Argument to Update the United States Criminal Code to
Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 978 (2008) (noting
that the lack of clarity in defining key terms, inability to react to changing technology, and
failure to combat non-interstate computer crime doomed the success of the 1984 Act).
36 See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2479;
Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual, supra note 19 (tracing the 1984 Act's legislative
evolution).
37 S. REP. No. 99-432, at 4.
[Vol. 7:2
KAPITANYAN
Government or certain financial institutions were involved, or where
the crime itself was interstate in nature.zS Instead of incremental
changes, however, the hearings culminated in a complete revision of
the Act in 1986.39 The CFAA was enacted to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
The 1986 Act expanded the scope of the 1984 Act by adding three
new felony offenses. Subsection 1O3o(a)(4) prohibits federal computer
fraud.40 Subsection 103O(a)(5) penalizes those who damage, alter, or
destroy another's data.41 Finally, subsection 1O3o(a)(6) criminalizes
trafficking in computer passwords, among other things.42 The new
offenses required a heightened mens rea of "intentionally," as
compared with "knowingly," the standard in the 1984 Act.43
The 1986 amendments also altered a number of provisions in the
1984 Act. Several are particularly noteworthy. Subsection 103O(a)(3)
was modified to make unauthorized access alone a criminal offense.44
The amendments also removed the use exemption that limited the
application of subsections 1o3o(a)(2) and 1O3o(a)(3), and changed
the mens rea requirements for those subsections from "knowingly" to
"intentionally." In line with the heightened scienter requirement, the
Senate Report noted that the 1986 amendments would:
38 Id. Congress was satisfied that this approach struck "the appropriate balance between
the Federal Government's interest in computer crime and the interests and abilities of the
States to proscribe and punish such offenses." Id.
39 See Skibell, supra note 35, at 912.
40 See id. at 913 (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 9). Though patterned after the mail and wire
fraud statutes, this subsection was distinguished from those statutes by requiring the use of
a computer for criminal liability to attach.
4 1 See id. (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 13, and noting that this was the most important
addition provided by the 1986 amendments). This essentially made computer hacking a
federal offense, and was designed to prohibit such activities as the distribution of malicious
code and denial of service attacks. See Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual, supra note
19. A denial of service attack is a hacking activity, which floods a victim computer with
useless information and prevents legitimate users from accessing it. Id.
42 See Skibell, supra note 35, at 913 (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 13).
43 See id. at 913-14 (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at lo). This was done to exempt those who
might mistakenly access a protected computer or stumble upon another's data protection.
See id. at 914 (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 5-6).
44 S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6. This alleviated concerns as to whether simple trespass alone
was a punishable offense, or if a further showing that the information accessed was used,
modified, destroyed, or disclosed was necessary.
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eliminate coverage for authorized access that aims at
'purposes to which such authorization does not extend.'
This [would] remove[] from the sweep of the statute
one of the murkier grounds of liability, under which a
Federal employee's access to computerized data might
be legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in
other (not clearly distinguishable) circumstances that
might be held to exceed his authorization.45
Finally, the amendments established definitions for a number of
key terms, including "exceeds authorized access," which was defined
as "to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to
obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter."46 The term "without authorization" has
never been defined. However, the Senate Report supporting passage
of the 1996 amendments to the CFAA suggests that persons who
exceed authorized access are likely to be insiders, while persons who
act without authorization are likely to be outsiders.47
Since 1986, the CFAA has been amended eight more times. Only
one of these amendments, the 1994 revision, is pertinent for the
purposes of this article.48 The renewed concern underlying this
revision once again was computer hackers, as Congress feared that
loopholes in the statute permitted some hackers to avoid
punishment.49 Congress sought to expand the CFAA to give the
45 S. REP. No. 99-432, at 21. The Senate Report noted that administrative sanctions should
be adequate to deal with real abuses of authorized access to Federal computers, and that
this change minimizes the likelihood that a Federal employee, uncertain of his authority,
would face a choice between disclosure mandates and criminal sanctions. Id.
46 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(6). The Senate Report found these definitions "self-explanatory." S.
REP. No. 99-432, at 12.
47 See Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual, supra note 19. The report further notes:
"[I]nsiders, who are authorized to access a computer, face criminal liability only if they
intend to cause damage to the computer, not for recklessly or negligently causing damage.
By contrast, outside hackers who break into a computer could be punished for any
intentional, reckless, or other damage they cause by their trespass." S. REP. No. 104-357, at
11 (1996).
48 The CFAA was subsequently amended in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and
2008. In 1994, Congress amended the CFAA as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 290001, 1o8 Stat. 2097, (1994).
49 See Galbraith, supra note 31, at 329.
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government more power to thwart their efforts, and did three things
of note.50 First, a private right of action was added in subsection
1030(g).51 Second, the statute's scope was expanded from "federal
interest computers" to all "protected computers."52 A "protected
computer" was defined to include the previous definition of a "federal
interest computer," as well as "a computer which is used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including
a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner
that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the
United States."53 (Since the advent of the internet, however, almost all
computer use has become interstate in nature.54) Finally, subsection
103o(a)(5) was amended to create two new substantive offenses-one
for intentional acts, and the other for reckless acts.55
The legislative history reveals that Congress has deliberately
broadened the CFAA several times since its inception only twenty-six
years ago. Each revision since 1986 has widened the depth and
breadth of the statute by adding substantive offenses, lowering levels
of scienter, or increasing penalties.56 Furthermore, Congress has
instructed that future revisions keep pace with technological
50 See id.
51 Although a significant means of expansion, the civil remedy seems to have received little
discussion in the Senate Report supporting passage of the 1994 amendment. See Kyle W.
Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems and
Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 429, 453 (2009).
52 See id.
53 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). Note that this was further amended in 2001 to include
computers outside of the United States so long as they affect "interstate or foreign
commerce or communication of the United States." See Prosecuting Computer Crimes
Manual, supra note 19.
54 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127
(W.D. Wash. 2000); see also Kerr, supra note 3, at 1568 ("[I]t seems that every computer
connected to the Internet is a "'protected computer" covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1030.").
55 See Skibell, supra note 35, at 914. Prior to this time, the CFAA did not punish
unintentional damage caused while accessing a system. Id.
56 See id. at 911 (citing U.S. v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002), and noting
that the consistent expansion of the statute has led at least one court to conclude that
where there is ambiguity in the statute, Congressional intent should be presumed to
support an expansive scope).
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development, and new forms of computer misuse, through a malleable
legal framework.57
D. STATUTORY STRUCTURE
The statute in its present form incorporates many of the revisions
discussed above, as well as prior and subsequent amendments to the
CFAA not explicitly mentioned. A review of the current statutory
structure provides insight into which interpretation of authorization
more naturally comports with textual considerations.
The CFAA establishes seven substantive offenses involving
unauthorized access to computers58 and, while the CFAA is a criminal
statute, it provides a private cause of action.59
Authorization is an element in most of the substantive provisions.
For instance, subsection 1030(a)(2) prohibits intentionally accessing a
computer without, or in excess of, authorization and obtaining
information from the financial records of a financial institution, the
United States government, or a protected (e.g., private) computer
used in interstate commerce. 6 °
Subsection 103o(a)(4) is another subsection that is commonly
evoked against rogue employees. This subsection prohibits knowingly
accessing a protected computer without, or in excess of, authorization,
with intent to defraud where such access furthers the intended fraud
and the violator obtains anything of value, including use of the
57 S. REP. No. 104-357, at 5 ("As computers continue to proliferate in businesses and
homes, and new forms of computer crimes emerge, Congress must remain vigilant to
ensure that the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute is up-to-date and provides law
enforcement with the necessary legal framework to fight computer crime. The [1996
amendments] will likely not represent the last amendment to this statute, but is necessary
and constructive legislation to deal with the current increase in computer crime.").
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 103O(a)(1)-(a)(7).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The right of action contains a two-element injury prerequisite. First,
a plaintiff must show she suffered damage or loss (as defined within the Act) as a result of a
violation of the Act. Id. Second, the conduct alleged must involve one of the following: (1)
loss to one or more persons during any one-year period aggregating at least $5,000; (2)
modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more persons; (3) physical injury to
any person; (4) a threat to public health or safety; (5) damage affecting a computer used by
or for an entity of the U.S. Government in furtherance of the administration of justice,
national defense, or national security. 18 U.S.C. § lo3o(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V).
60 18 U.S.C. § 1O3O(a)(2). Note also that "obtaining" information carries an expansive
meaning, which includes the mere observation of data. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6.
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computer if the value of such use exceeds $5,000 in a one-year
period.61
Subsection 103o(a)(5) addresses computer hacking and contains
two categories of offenses which differ based on their respective mens
rea requirements. Subsection 103o(a)(5)(A) prohibits knowingly
causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causing
damage, without authorization, to a protected computer.62 This
subsection applies regardless of whether the user had authorization to
access the computer. Subsection 103o(a)(5)(B) prohibits intentionally
accessing a protected computer without authorization, and as a result
of such conduct recklessly causing damage. Subsection lO3o(a)(5)(C)
is nearly identical. However, it substitutes recklessness for the mens
rea and requires that the violator cause damage and loss (loss is an
added element). 63
Subsections 103O(a)(1), 1o3o(a)(3), lo3o(a)(6), and lo3o(a)(7)
are not frequently used against rogue employees. Additionally, the
latter two subsections do not prohibit unauthorized access on its face
and thus do not require it as a condition precedent for liability.
Section III proceeds to examine and appraise the alternative
interpretations of authorization after reviewing the use of the CFAA in
the employment relationship.
III. THE CFAA AND EMPLOYMENT
A. THE CFAA IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Considering the extent to which the workplace has become
digitalized, it is unsurprising that computer misuse by employees has
emerged as a serious concern. Though employers may resort to state
common law claims for relief (such as tortious interference with
6,18 U.S.C. § 1o3o(a)(4). Courts have interpreted fraud within the meaning of this statute
broadly. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1126 (W.D. Wash. 2000). This interpretation, however, serves to balance a fight
nexus implicit in this statute as compared to the sister mail and wire fraud statutes.
Computer use that is extraneous to an intended fraud is not covered by subsection
1030(a)(4). It would be if this subsection was patterned directly after the mail and wire
fraud statutes. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 9 ("To be prosecuted under this subsection, the
use of the computer must be more directly linked to the intended fraud.").
62 18 U.S.C. § 103o(a)(5)(A).
63 18 U.S.C. § lO3o(a)(5)(C).
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business relations, theft of trade secrets, breach of employment
contract, or breach of fiduciary duty), the CFAA provides an attractive
alternative because it allows plaintiffs to bring claims against the
former employee and her new employer, provides a basis for federal
jurisdiction, and allows for injunctive relief. Moreover, the CFAA
provides a remedy without requiring the employer to prove the breach
of an employment agreement or that the data taken is secret or
confidential. 64 Employers need only show unauthorized access to a
protected computer and the requisite damages.
Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.65
was the first case to apply the CFAA to the exploits of a rogue
employee. After Congress established a private cause of action under
the CFAA, and prior to Shurgard, most CFAA litigation focused upon
unsolicited (and unauthorized) bulk email and closely related
commercial disputes.66 Until this time, employers had not turned to
the CFAA for relief from harm caused by rogue employees.
The facts of Shurgard present the quintessential rogue employee
fact pattern. Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. was an industry leader in
the full and self-service storage business, a high barrier to entry
market.67 Safeguard Self-Storage was its direct competitor. 68 Pursuant
to its business strategy, Shurgard had developed a sophisticated
system of indentifying target sites and assessing their economic value
64 See Posting of Robert Milligan and Carolyn Sieve of Seyfarth Shaw to
TradingSecretslaw.com, Oct. 28, 2009, available at
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/uploads/file/Establishing%2oCFAA%2oViolations%20-
%2oLaw%2o36o.pdf; Peter J. Pizzi, Disloyal Employees: Computer Abuse Law Turns on
Meaning of 'Without Authorization,' N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 2006, at 5 (noting the CFAA can
provide a remedy against a former employee unavailable under state law in jurisdictions
that refrain from enforcing non-compete agreements, such as California).
65Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000). Note that this case has been
overruled to some extent by LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F. 3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
66 See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(e-mail bombing of competitor's internet service provider); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM,
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (unsolicited bulk e-mail); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., loo F.Supp.2d 1058, 1O6O (N.D. Cal. 2000) (unauthorized use of automated
querying program on plaintiffs website); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d
238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (unauthorized use of "search robots" to extract names of registrants
from website).
67 Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
6 8 Id. at 1122-23.
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to its business model.69 To this end, Shurgard invested significant
resources in creating a marketing team to become familiar with
potential target markets, identify potential sites, and develop key
relationships with brokers and sellers in those markets.7o This
business strategy had allowed Shurgard to sustain its growth and
development for twenty-five years. 71 Safeguard entered the market in
1997, three years before the disposition of the case, and two years
before the events that precipitated the dispute.72
Eric Leland was a regional development manager for Shurgard.73
On account of his position at Shurgard, he was entrusted with full
access to the company's confidential business plans, expansion plans,
and other trade secrets. 74 In 1999, Leland was approached by
Safeguard and offered a position.75 Shortly thereafter, while still
employed by Shurgard, Leland sent e-mails containing Shurgard's
trade secrets and proprietary information to Safeguard
representatives without Shurgard's approval or knowledge.76 Leland
continued to supply Safeguard with this type of information after
leaving Shurgard.77 Shurgard sued Safeguard under subsections
1030(a)(2)(C), 103o(a)(4), and 103o(a)(5)(C), seeking damages and
injunctive relief.78 Shurgard argued that Leland's authorization ended
when he began acting as an agent for Safeguard, making him
unauthorized to access the information in question.79 Safeguard
contended in its defense that Leland had been given full access to the
information in question and, thus, was not without, or in excess of,
69 Id. at 1123.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1122.
72 Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1124.
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authorization. 80 The litigants' positions depended upon different
definitions of "authorization." While Shurgard employed a legalistic
interpretation, relying upon agency law to define authorization, 8'
Safeguard relied upon a narrow technological interpretation, which
instead dictated that whoever is granted access as a preliminary
matter is absolutely authorized to use that access, regardless of their
purpose in doing so.82
The court looked first to the language of CFAA, noting that its
unambiguous meaning should be the first and final inquiry unless it
would lead to an absurd result.83 Although it found the agency-based
interpretation of authority to pass muster under this standard, and
accepted it, the court examined the legislative history of the CFAA to
determine whether it was appropriate to apply the statute to
employees (i.e., insiders), in addition to outsiders (e.g., hackers). 84
The court noted that while the original scope of the statute was limited
to outsiders, "its subsequent amendments have broadened the scope
significantly to cover [rogue employees]." 85 The court found support
for this interpretation of the legislative history in congressional
reports demonstrating the broad meaning and intended scope of the
terms "protected computer" and "without authorization,"
congressional intent to permit a CFAA claim to rest alongside a
copyright claim, and intent to punish those who illegally use
computers for commercial advantage. 86
In reaching its conclusion to apply an agency-based interpretation
of authorization, the court relied upon United States v. Morris.87 In
Morris, a computer user who was authorized to access a computer and
its programs via an account with his university lost authorization
8oId.
8, Shurgard cited to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) for this
proposition.
82 This has been referred to as a code-based interpretation of authorization. See Kerr,
supra note 17.
83 Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
84 Id. at 1127-29.
85 Id. at 1127.
86 Id. at 1127-29.
87 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
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when he used the programs in an unauthorized way.8 8 The court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that Morris had been working
on a computer virus (a "worm") in order to demonstrate the
inadequacies of current network security measures.8 9 Morris took
measures to minimize the worm's interference with the network it
infiltrated, but the worm ended up causing havoc in many of the
computers it infected.9o In finding criminal liability under subsection
103o(a)(5)(A), the court reasoned that Morris's conduct fell well
within the area of unauthorized access because while he was
technically authorized to use the networks in question, he "did not use
[the network features] in any way related to their intended function."91
8 8 d. at 505.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 506.
91Id. at 510. Furthermore, Morris presents a useful vantage point into the debate that will
be explored in Part V infra. While the court acknowledged that Morris was explicitly
authorized to use the computers in question, id. at 505, 509-10, it framed the question as
whether his transmission of the worm constituted an act for which he was not authorized
(or which exceeded his authorization). Id. at 510. In this endeavor, the court threaded a
thin line. Although it rhetorically erected the framework of the narrow, code-based (or
technological) definition of authority, the court relied upon a non-code-based system of
social norms-what society considers an appropriate or inappropriate use of a computer-
to reach its result. This seems to be the focus of the court's "intended function" test. Id.
Commentators have thoughtfully expounded the ideological mechanism inherent in this
test. See Winn, supra note 3, at 14o8 ("What Morris ... establish[es], then, is not so much
a point of law, but a point of logic. Machines can authorize nothing. The idea of
authorization necessarily requires reference to human beings-in particular, reference to a
system of established rights and duties in a community[.] [M]achines alone cannot supply
the law with a system of norms."); Kerr, supra note 17, at 1632 (noting that the intended
function test "appears to derive largely from a sense of social norms in the community of
computer users"). While it may be argued that "intended function" refers to the nature of
Morris's access, and thus comports with a code-based understanding of authorization,
under a code-based test such an inquiry is superfluous, as the court had already noted that
Morris himself was authorized to use the computer. Therefore, the intended function
analysis evaluated not Morris's access per se, but rather what he did with that access. Thus,
it seems as though "intended function" served as a legal proxy used to assess the manner in
which an actor utilizes the access he is granted, distancing the test from a pure code-based
interpretation of authorization. Alternative understandings of the Morris approach, which
seek to further unite its reasoning and outcome under the code-based umbrella, have also
been suggested. See Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract:
Determining Employees'Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107
MICH. L. REv. 819, 825 (2009) (finding Morris's intended function test to be similar to a
code-based interpretation because violation of the intended function is often done through
technical means, such as finding holes in programs, or bypassing passwords or other
protection systems); United States v. Aleynikov, No. lo Cr. 96(DLC), 2010 WL 3489383, at
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The preliminary question of whether the CFAA can be applied in
the employment context should be answered in the affirmative. The
original House report supporting passage of the 1984 Act cited two
cases to illustrate the necessity of a computer crime statute analogous
to the mail and wire fraud statutes. 92 In the first case, a former
employee used an active employee's username and password to tap
into his former employer's computer system via remote terminal, and
accessed confidential software.93 In the second case, a former
employee who was given daily access to the Federal Reserve Board's
computer by telephone was apprehended and convicted when he
continued to access the system using the access code of an unwitting
colleague.94 The fact that both of these cases involved access by
employees, albeit former employees, indicates that Congress was not
solely concerned with deterring hackers when it passed the original
statute.95 Even courts rejecting the Shurgard approach have noted
that the employment relationship is an appropriate context for the
statute's application. Both the Black & Decker and US Bioservices
courts agreed with the Shurgard court that the CFAA's legislative
history supports the proposition that the statute applies not only to
"outsiders," but also to "insiders" such as present and former
*16 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010) (noting that while Morris had authorization to access the
university computer system, he acted without authorization when he exploited a special
and unauthorized access route into other computers for which he had no authority).
Indeed, the state of the law on this issue in the Second Circuit is somewhat in flux.
Compare Aleynikov, 2010 WL 3489383, at *17 (authority not lost when employee
misappropriated employer's information) with Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine
LLC, No. 09 Civ. 8122(LMM), 2010 WL 2034404, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010)
(employee's actions in contravention of employment agreement were in excess of
authorization). As the Aleynikov decision highlights, it is also noteworthy that, as an
alternative basis for its holding, the Morris court cited the lower court's finding that "the
evidence also demonstrated that the worm was designed to spread to other computers at
which [Morris] had no account and no authority, express or implied, to unleash the worm
program." Morris, 928 F.2d at 510. Thus, in contrast to the primary basis for its holding,
the court's alternative basis comports with a pure code-based interpretation of
authorization.
92 H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3691-92.
93 United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 153-55 (4th Cir. 1978).
94 A summary of the relevant facts can be found at Filching Figures, TIME, Jan. 17, 1983,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,951875,oo.html.
95 The 1996 Senate report shows similar intent to include employees within the CFAA's
ambit. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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employees.96 The Black & Decker court further noted that the
statutory structure provides additional support, as the statute
"criminalizes] certain conduct committed by "whoever," [without]
providing any affirmative defenses relating to "insider" status."97
Since 2000, courts have struggled with delineating a proper
conception of authority within the meaning of the CFAA. Although
Shurgard was the first case of its kind, it certainly has not been the
only attempt to offer a viable interpretation of the elusive concept. The
following subsection further explores the diverging paths in the
interpretation of authority.
B. DIVERGING INTERPRETATIONS OF AUTHORIZATION
There is a split in legal authority as to whether an employee acts
without authorization when he obtains data that he is entitled to
access, but uses that data in a manner that is inconsistent with a
contractual obligation (e.g., as set out in an employment agreement or
employee handbook) or his employer's interests (e.g., as seen in
Shurgard). This section begins with an overview of three approaches
to the problem-authority as interpreted via agency, contract, and
code-and suggests a consolidated approach through which to view
these alternatives.
1. AUTHORIZATION GOVERNED By AGENCY
Although Shurgard was its precursor, International Airport
Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin98 is the marquee case for the agency-based
interpretation of authorization. Jacob Citrin was an employee of a real
estate-focused firm affiliated with International Airport Centers. 99 He
was charged with identifying and assisting in the acquisition of
properties presenting a favorable business opportunity to
International Airport Centers.o ° Citrin was provided with a laptop to
facilitate his work of identifying potential acquisition targets. When he
96 See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 n. 3 (W.D.Tenn. 2oo8); US
Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 n. 4 (D. Kan. 2009).
97 Black & Decker, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 936 n. 3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
98 Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 44o F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 20o6).
99 Id. at 419.
o0 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
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decided to quit, however, Citrin deleted all the data he collected and
stored on the laptop, as well as data that would have revealed his
improper conduct before deciding to quit. He also took additional
steps to prevent the recovery of the deleted data.101 International
Airport Centers pursued a civil cause of action against Citrin under
subsection 1o3o(a)(5)(A)(i), which prohibits intentionally causing
damage without authorization to a protected computer.1 0 2 In addition
to this alleged violation, Judge Posner noted that Citrin's conduct also
violated subsection 103o(a)(5)(A)(ii), which prohibits intentionally
accessing a protected computer without authorization.103 Relying
upon the Restatement of Agency and Shurgard, the court found that
by destroying the data that would have incriminated him, as well as
other data belonging to his employer, Citrin acted in violation of the
duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on employees. 1° 4 Moreover,
"Citrin's breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency
relationship... and with it his authority to access the laptop, because
the only basis of his authority had been that relationship."1°5
Both Shurgard and Citrin relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 112.106 This section deems the authority of an agent to
terminate if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse
interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of duty.107 The
Citrin court also relied upon section 387 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY.10 8 This section notes that "[u]nless otherwise
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for
the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency."'1 9 Together, these principles establish a rule that would find
01 Id. The data would have been easily recoverable if Citrin had not loaded the laptop with
a secure-erase program.
1
0 2 Id. This is now subsection 103O(a)(5)(A).
10 3 Id. at 420. This is now subsection 1O3O(a)(5)(B).
104 Id.
105 Id at 420-21.
1O6 Id. at 420; Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958).
108 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
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an employee to have acted without authorization when his
intentions" o became adverse to those of his employer.-" This would be
the case even if the employee had been given full technical access to
use his employer's computer system. Thus, an employee acts with
authorization when he acts in accordance with work-related functions,
but loses such authorization when he acts against his employer's
interests, such as to assist a competitor to his current employer's
detriment. This interpretation of authority is unconcerned with the
degree of technical access; rather, it looks to the nature of that access.
2. AUTHORIZATION GOVERNED BY CODE
1 12
If an agency-based interpretation of authority can be said to favor
the employer, a code-based interpretation surely favors the employee.
In Shurgard, the defendant's principal argument was that the
employee possessed technical access to view the data in question.
110 Intent in this context should not be confused with the notion of acting intentionally, the
mens rea needed to constitute most violations of the CFAA. See, e.g., supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
I In contrast, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY collapses these principles into a one-
step mechanism for determining authority. Rather than authority becoming established via
assent and then terminated pursuant to the acquisition of adverse interests or a serious
breach of loyalty, a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) approach would hold that an agent "acts with
actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations
to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). Thus, the "focal point for determining whether an agent acted with
actual authority is the time of action, not the time of the principal's manifestation, which
may be earlier." Id. § 3.06, comment b. As one commentator has noted, this approach
tightens some of the conceptual gaps in a Citrin analysis because it evaluates whether
authority actually existed to begin with, as opposed to whether the circumstances were
such to terminate it. Field, supra note 91, at 845 n. 155. However, as a practical matter, it
would seem that the same circumstances that would terminate authority under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) would deem it not to have come into existence at all under
RESTATEMENT (THIRD). Accordingly, the one-step approach does not seem to provide any
meaningful advantage to the two-step approach aside from shifting the doctrinal vantage
point.
112 This interpretation of authority has heretofore been described as the "technological" or
.narrow" interpretation. All three terms (i.e., code-based, technological, and narrow) are
meant to reference the same model of interpretation, and are used interchangeably.
Moreover, this interpretation pegs the legal definition of authorization to the physical
degree of access that a user possesses. For example, a computer user who is unable to
access a password-protected database because she does not know the password lacks
authorization to access that database.
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Based on this, the defendant reasoned, his access could not be deemed
unauthorized. Although the Shurgard court rejected this
interpretation, it has support among federal courts 113 and scholarly
commentators.I 4 The Ninth Circuit recently became the first federal
appellate court to adopt this interpretation. 11  This narrower
interpretation of authority holds that a violation for accessing data
without authorization under the CFAA occurs only where initial access
is not permitted.
In LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, LVRC, a residential addiction
treatment center, hired Christopher Brekka to oversee multiple
aspects of its facility, including internet marketing and coordinating
with the website provider. 1" 6 Brekka, however, also owned and
operated two of his own consulting businesses at the time. 117 These
businesses obtained referrals for addiction rehabilitation services and
provided referrals of potential patients to rehabilitation facilities
through websites and advertisements."18 Because Brekka had to
commute from Florida to Nevada, he often e-mailed work-related
documents from his LVRC work computer to his personal computer in
Florida. 19 This was not impermissible, as LVRC and Brekka did not
have a written employment agreement and there existed no employee
guidelines prohibiting him from doing so. 120 A month into his
113 See Lewis-Burke Associates LLC v. Widder, No. 09-302 (JMF), 2010 WL 2926161, at *5
(D.D.C. July 28, 2010) (noting that the code-based line of cases has "recently gained
critical mass"); Lockheed Martin v. Speed, No. 6:o5-CV-158o-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058,
at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug 1, 2006); Diamond Power Int'l v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1342 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 (D. Ariz.
2oo8); Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. o6-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 13, 2007); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-
Masuda, 39o F.Supp.2d 479, 498 (D. Md. 2005).
114 See Kerr, supra note 17; Field, supra note 91; Brenton, supra note 51; Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164 (2004);, Greg Pollaro, Disloyal
Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2OlO DuKE
L. &TECH. REV. 12 (2010).
115 See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129-33 (9th Cir. 2009).
116 Id. at 1129.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129.
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employment with LVRC, Brekka received an administrative username
and password to LVRC's website.121 With this login, he gained access
to information about LVRC's website, including website usage
statistics key to managing the firm's Internet marketing.122 Two
months later, Brekka and LVRC engaged in discussions regarding the
possibility of Brekka purchasing an equity interest in LVRC.123 He e-
mailed himself LVRC data, including marketing budget information
and a master admissions report, which included the names of past and
current patients.124 However, discussions soon broke down and
Brekka left LVRC.125 Two months later, while performing routine
monitoring of the LVRC website, an administrator noticed that
someone was accessing the usage statistics under Brekka's
username.12 6 LVRC deactivated his access and brought suit against
Brekka, alleging a violation of subsections 103o(a)(2) and 103o(a)(4)
arising from when he emailed LVRC documents to himself and
continued to access the LVRC website after his employment ceased.127
In examining whether Brekka's access was unauthorized, the court
looked first to the language of CFAA, noting that unless otherwise
defined, words within statutes are to be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.12 8 Under this standard,
the court found "permission or power granted by an authority" to be
an appropriate denotation of authorization, and further found
Brekka's access to meet this metric because LVRC gave him
permission to use its computer.12 9 The court reasoned, "when an
employer authorizes an employee to use a company computer subject
to certain limitations, the employee remains authorized to use the
21Id.
122 ld.
123Id.
124 Id. at 1129-30.
125 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1130.
126Id.
127 Id. at 1129-30.
128 Id. at 1132-33 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 44 (1979)).
129 Id. at 1133 (citing the Random House Unabridged Dictionary).
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computer even if the employee violates those limitations. '"130 Thus,
access is unauthorized only when the employer decides to terminate it
or when the employee did not have permission to begin with. Access
exceeds authorization when a user has permission to access the
computer but accesses information she is not entitled to access. 131
Because Brekka had permission to use the computer and did not lack
permission to e-mail data to himself, he acted with authorization.132
In rejecting the Citrin approach, the Brekka court invoked the rule
of lenity, noting that it is well established that ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.133
This method of narrow statutory construction requires courts to "limit
the reach of criminal statutes to the clear import of their text and
construe any ambiguity against the government."'134 Of course, the
Brekka court was not the first or last to apply this principle of
jurisprudence to the issue of authorization in the CFAA context. 135 In
reaching outcomes consistent with Brekka, courts often have relied
upon the lenity principle to find for the employee. Others, however,
have rejected a defense rooted in the logic of lenity.136
13o Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133.
13' Id.
132 Id. The court then determined whether Brekka violated the CFAA by logging into the
LVRC website after he left the firm. This inquiry indicates that the court did not employ a
full code-based approach, but rather tempered it with its "permission" test. Under a
complete code-based approach, this inquiry would have been superfluous-even though he
left the firm, he still had an active login, meaning his access was still authorized.
'33 Id. at 1134-35; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) ("Ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes shall be resolved in favor of lenity."). The rule of lenity is
rooted in McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
134 Brekka. 581 F.3d at 1135.
135 See, e.g., Lewis-Burke Assocs. v. Widder, No. 09-302 (JMF) 2010 WL 2926161, at *5
(D.D.C. July 28, 2010); Orbit One Comm'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F.Supp.2d 373,
386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966-67 (D. Ariz.
2oo8); Lockheed Martin v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-158o-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 20o6); Cenveo, Inc. v. Rao, 659 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316-17 n. 3 (D. Conn.
2009); US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194 n. 5 (D. Kansas 2009);
Brett Senior & Associates, P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. o6-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2007); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tenn.
2008).
136 See United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at 7 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 2009); United States. v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 273 (5th Cir. 201o). The Nosal court
noted that the rule of lenity is only appropriate when there is statutory ambiguity. Nosal,
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In addition to the lenity principle, courts rejecting the Citrin
approach have commonly invoked three additional arguments. First,
courts have reasoned that because a CFAA violation is based upon a
defendant's unauthorized access rather than her unauthorized use, a
claim does not exist when an employee possesses technical access but
harbors nefarious intent.'37 Second, courts have noted that the Citrin
approach conflates the meaning of "without authorization" and
"exceeds authorized access" in contravention of parameters
established in section lO3o(e)(6), which provides the statutory
definition of the latter phrase.l38 The Citrin approach thus renders the
distinction meaningless because both prongs are assigned the same
meaning. Finally, courts have rejected the Citrin approach on account
of legislative history.'39 Courts have noted that the statute's original
aim was to create a cause of action against hackers, and that in
support of its passage, the House Committee specifically noted that
"Section 103o deals with an 'unauthorized access' concept of computer
fraud rather than the mere use of a computer."140 In addition, courts
have emphasized the fact that in 1986, Congress amended the statute
to substitute the phrase "exceeds authorized access" in place of
"having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity
such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does
2009 WL 981336, at -7. Applied to the CFAA, the court found the principle unavailing
because there is no ambiguity in the statute. Id. Rather, "ample authority exists to permit
criminal actions to proceed based on violations of [section lO3O(a)(4)] by employees, as
interpreted by ciil cases, and there is simply no statutory basis to suggest otherwise." Id.
(citing Shurgard Storage Ctrs. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126
(W.D. Wash. 2000)). In light of Brekka, however, many of the government's CFAA claims
were dismissed on the defendant's motion for reconsideration. United States v. Nosal, No.
C 08-0237, 2010 WL 934257, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010).
137 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F.
Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. Md. 2005); Speed, 2006 WL 2683058, at *5; Diamond Power
Intern. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (citing Speed); Black &
Decker, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 934 (citing Speed); Lugo, 595 F.Supp.2d at 1193.
138 See, e.g., Diamond Power Intern., 540 F.Supp.2d at 1342-43; Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at
965 (citing Diamond Power Intern.); Lugo, 595 F.Supp.2d at 1193; B & B Microscopes v.
Armogida, 532 F.Supp.2d 744, 758 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Speed, 2oo6 WL 2683058, at *6.
139 See, e.g., Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96; Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66;
Black & Decker, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 935-36.
140 See Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 20 (1984), as
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3689, 3706).
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not extend."'14 By enacting this amendment, and by providing a
definition for "exceeds authorized access," these courts have reasoned
that congressional intent was contrary to the Citrin approach.142
3. AUTHORIZATION GOVERNED BY CONTRACT
The final type of interpretation focuses upon the breach of an
express or implicit agreement to determine whether one's access is
authorized or unauthorized. This interpretation is often invoked in
cases concerning website terms of service agreements and
employment agreements, 143 and stipulates that such contractual terms
can define what constitutes authorized access. As one court recently
noted, "[w]ithin the breach of contract approach, most courts that
have considered the issue have held that a conscious violation of a
website's terms of service/use will render the access unauthorized
and/or cause it to exceed authorization."'144
The contract-based interpretation is perhaps best understood
through two First Circuit cases arising under the same facts.145
Explorica, a company formed in 2000 to compete in the field of global
tours for high school students, hired several former employees of EF,
a company which had been engaged in the teenage tour market for
more than thirty-five years. 146 Philip Gormley, Explorica's Chief
Information Officer, previously Vice President of Information Strategy
at EF, sought to gain a substantial advantage over firms like EF by
141 See id. at 966; Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 499 n. 12 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-
432, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2486).
142 See Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 499 n. 12 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-432, at 21,
1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2494-95); Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
143 See Field, supra note 91, at 827-28.
144 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D.449, 46o-61 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing, among other
cases, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245-251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) and Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450
(E.D. Va. 1998), and finding that an intentional breach of MySpace.com's terms of use
agreement can potentially constitute accessing the MySpace computer/server without
authorization and/or in excess of authorization under the CFAA).
145 The two cases are EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (lst Cir. 2001)
and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003).
146 Explorica, 274 F.3d at 580.
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undercutting their prices on student tours. 147 This was achieved via a
"scraper," a computer program used to access information contained
in a succession of webpages stored on an accessed computer via the
HTML source code which is available to anyone who views the
website.148 Explorica used its scraper to copy the price of each EF tour
through every possible city. 149 After "scraping" two years of data from
EF's website, Explorica set its own prices for tours, undercutting EF's
prices by an average of five percent.150 Upon learning of this practice,
EF brought suit against Explorica, several Explorica employees, and
Zefer Corporation, the company that designed and utilized the
scraper, alleging violations of subsections lO3o(a)(4), 103O(a)(5)(c),
and 103o(a)(6)(A). 151
Using a "reasonable expectations" test, the district court held that
lack of authorization could be inferred from the circumstances and
was so inferred on the basis of three such circumstances: (1) the
copyright notice on EF's homepage with a link directing users to
contact the company with questions; (2) the scraper's bypassing of
technical restrictions embedded in the website permitting ordinary
users to view the site only one page at a time; and (3) the likely
violation of a confidentiality agreement between Gormley and EF
arising because Gormley provided to Zefer technical instructions
regarding the creation of the scraper. 5 2
Although the Explorica court could have affirmed on the code-
based violation, it chose instead to affirm on account of the broad
confidentiality agreement Explorica's current, and EF's former,
employees had violated.5a The court held that EF's allegations, if true,
would "likely prove that whatever authorization Explorica had to
navigate around EF's website (even in a competitive vein), it exceeded
147 Id.; Zefer, 318 F.3d at 61.
148 Zefer, 318 F.3d at 60. A scraper is also known as a "robot" or "bot." Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 62; Explorica, 274 F.3d at 58o-81.
153 Explorica, 274 F.3d at 581-82. By affirming on these grounds, the court did not reach
the question of whether the use of a scraper alone rendered the access unauthorized. Id.
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that authorization by providing proprietary information and know-
how to Zefer to create the scraper.154
In Zefer, the court added several important highlights to its
opinion in Explorica. Here, no confidentiality agreement existed
between Zefer and EF. In considering the application of a code-based
approach, the court assessed the propriety of the district court's
reasonable expectations test.155 The court agreed that lack of
authorization may be implicit, rather than explicit, but rejected
reasonable expectations as a default rule in this context because it was
"neither prescribed by the statute nor prudentially sound."'156 The
court further noted that code-based interpretations of authorization
may be deemed inconsistent with a test based upon reasonable
expectations, pondering rhetorically "[w]hy should.., the provision of
page-by-page access . . . be taken to suggest that downloading
information at higher speed is forbidden.' ' 157 Although EF seemingly
disliked the use of the scraper to construct Explorica's database, it
would have equally disliked the compilation of such a database
manually without the use of a scraper. 158 Moreover, the court
preferred to require a public website provider to spell out explicitly
what is forbidden, rather than put users at the mercy of a "highly
imprecise, litigation-spawning standard like 'reasonable
expectations.'"159 An independent preliminary injunction against Zefer
was unwarranted.16°
154 Id. at 583.
155 Zefer, 318 F.3d at 62-64.
156 Id. at 63. Notably, the court added: "password protection itself normally limits
authorization by implication (and technology), even without express terms." Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 63. A prohibition against the latter would raise "serious public policy concerns."
Id.
159 Id. at 63. "If EF wants to ban scrapers, let it say so[.] [W]ith rare exceptions, public
website providers ought to say just what non-password protected access they purport to
forbid." Id. at 63-64. But cf. note 156, supra (leaving room for password protection to
establish lack of authorization by implication).
16o Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63. However, the injunction was affirmed because Zefer, as a
defendant in the Explorica case, was on notice of the injunction and thus precluded from
acting in concert with, on behalf of, or at the direction of Explorica to use the scraper to
access EF's information. Id.
['Vol. 7:2-432
KAPITANYAN
Courts examining whether authorization may be governed by
contract have generally answered the question in the affirmative. 161 As
a result, practitioners generally support the execution of employment
agreements or explicit company policies defining, among other things,
what access would be deemed authorized and what would be
considered unauthorized.162
4. A CONSOLIDATED APPROACH
Although courts and scholars have addressed the three
aforementioned interpretations as distinct, this article employs a
dichotomous approach because the contract and agency-based
approaches are identical in regard to their focus on what the employee
intends to do via his access.163 Thus, there are actually two
approaches, not three. The distinction between them is based upon
whether the employee's intent (e.g., to act on behalf of a competitor)
or the employer's actions (e.g., erecting password protection) should
be used as a basis for determining whether certain employee conduct
is authorized or not.
The agency and contract-based interpretations focus upon the
intentions of the employee. The key question is whether the employee
is acting in accordance with the interests of her current employer, or
instead harbors nefarious intent, such as the advancement of her own
interests or those of another (future) employer. The contract-based
interpretation fits within this category because, as one court aptly
noted, the "common thread" in cases employing this interpretation is
a focus on the employee's motive for accessing a computer and her
,61 But see, e.g,. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931-36 (W.D. Tenn.
20o8) (finding that while employee had previously signed a confidentiality, termination,
and employee access agreements with his former employer, he did not act lack
authorization to copy a large volume of confidential and proprietary information from his
former employer's secure servers via an external storage device and his personal email
account because he had permission to access the information in question and doing so was
within the scope of his duties).
162 See, e.g., Akerman, supra note 4; Bill Barnhart, Circuits Split Over Application of
Computer Fraud Law, Dec. 1, 2009, InsideCounsel, available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2009/December-2009/Pages/Circuits-Split-Over-
Application-of-.aspx.
163 Although "intent" is used throughout this article to describe the crux of this approach, it
is also helpful to conceptualize this approach as focusing upon the employee's purpose-
viz., whether or not the employee has acted in accordance with the duties and
responsibilities associated with this work-related functions.
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intended use of the information obtained. 164 Thus, within the
employee's intent approach, agency-based and contract-based
interpretations merely constitute a spectrum of legal doctrines to
define authorization from the same focal point-the employee's
intentions.
The alternative approach focuses on the employer and examines
whether the employer, by his actions, has technically granted the
employee permission to access a particular document or database.
This approach primarily encompasses what has heretofore been
referred to as the "code-based," "technological," or "narrow"
interpretation of authorization. The key question under this approach
is whether the employee was physically given access to employer
information, often via a password or terminal. If an employee has not
manipulated technological barriers to gain access to information (e.g.,
by using a stolen password or a coworker's computer), she is not in
violation of the access element of the CFAA-even if her intention is to
obtain her current employer's information solely for the benefit of a
future employer who wishes to compete with her current employer.
This consolidated approach simplifies the issue of what constitutes
"authorization." Part IV provides an overview of scholarly
commentary relating to the interpretation of authorization.
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of the relevant scholarly commentary provides an
important backdrop to interpreting authorization because it expands
the issue from a discrete question to one which necessary implicates
larger theoretical debates, such as criminal law in the digital context
and the debate regarding the merit of a cyberproperty regime.165 These
areas of inquiry overlap with commentary assessing the merits of the
three aforementioned interpretations of authorization and provide
helpful guidance in resolving the immediate question of what
constitutes authorization.
The two scholars whose views on the interpretation of
authorization seem to have gained the most traction among courts
both endorse the adoption of a code-based approach but differ in the
164 Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. o6-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2007); see also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, 'Unauthorized Access' Under
Computer Fraud, Abuse Act, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 2008, at 3 (noting the same in regard to the
Citrin line of cases).
165 See supra note 25.
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mechanical aspects of such an approach and its supporting
rationale.166 Professor Kerr argues that courts should reject contract-
based notions of authorization, and instead limit the scope of
unauthorized access to the circumvention of code-based
restrictions.167 Professor Kerr's proposed framework would require
courts to interpret "access" broadly: "A user accesses a computer any
time the user sends a command to that computer that the computer
executes.' 168 This approach would define "access" as any successful
interaction with a computer. 69 Kerr draws support for this
interpretation of access on account of the following: Because
technology will continue advancing, this approach will eliminate
access as a limit on the scope of unauthorized access statutes, and
place considerable weight on the meaning of authorization.17 ° This
broad approach to access would be balanced by limiting the phrase
"without authorization" to the circumvention of code-based
restrictions. 1'1 Kerr advances instrumental,72 historical,173 and
,66 See Kerr, supra note 17, at 17; Bellia, supra note 114. Kerr and Bellia are not the only
commentators to endorse a code-based approach. See, e.g., Brenton, supra note 51, at 460;
Field, supra note 91, at 819; see also Mary W. S. Wong, Cyber-trespass and 'Unauthorized
Access'as Legal Mechanisms ofAccess Control: Lessons from the US Experience, 15 INT'L
J. L. & INFO. TECH. 90, 125 (2007) (considering alternative approaches unwise); Nicholas
R. Johnson, "IAgree" to Criminal Liability: Lori Drew's Prosecution Under
§1o3o(A)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Why Every Internet User
Should Care, 2009 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 561, 583-88 (2009) (discussing Drew and
suggesting a code-based approach). Kerr and Bellia, however, seem to lead when
considering judicial reliance on their work (i.e., citations).
,67 Kerr, supra note 17, at 1644; see also Lemley, supra note 25, at 528 ("An even more
serious problem is the judicial application of the [CFAA], which was designed to punish
malicious hackers, to make it illegal-indeed, criminal-to seek information from a publicly
available website if doing so would violate the terms of a [contractual] license."). Kerr
would also reject an agency-based approach. Kerr, supra note 17, at 1632 (referring to
Shurgard as "strikingly broad").
168 Kerr, supra note 17, at 1646.
16 9 Id. at 1646-47.
170 Id. at 1647-48.
171 Id. at 1644. Access would be deemed "without authorization" only when it violates the
Morris intended function test, or else uses false identification to trick the computer into
granting the user greater privileges. Id. at 1649. For a discussion of this test, see note 91
supra.
172 Id. at 1644. It would allow Internet users to enjoy as much freedom as possible to do as
they wish online and protect the privacy and security of Internet users and their data. Id. In
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doctrinal'74 rationales in support of this interpretation of
authorization. Finally, Kerr cautions that a contract-based approach
would "allow ... a computer owner to harness the criminal law at his
discretion, using his unilateral power to control authorization by
contract as a tool to criminalize any viewpoint or status the owner
wishes to target."175
Professor Bellia reaches the same conclusion, arguing that "only
breach of a code-based control on access should trigger liability"
under the CFAA.17 6 Bellia's proposed interpretation differs from Kerr's
first in terms of how "access" should be defined. While Kerr endorses
a broad reading of the term, Bellia finds a narrow reading to be more
"natural.177 This reading focuses "not merely on the successful
exchange of electronic signals, but rather on conduct by which one is
in a position to obtain privileges or information not available to the
general public."178 Bellia further drifts from Kerr by providing textual
arguments to support her thesis. She points to several prohibitions in
the CFAA that contemplate obtaining generally unavailable
information, such as national security information and financial and
contrast, a contract-based approach would "grant computer network owners too much
power to regulate what Internet users do, and how they do it, sacrificing a great deal of
freedom for a small gain in privacy and security." Id. at 1650.
173 Kerr, supra note 17 at 1649.
174 Id. at 1652. It tracks the traditional treatment that analogous issues have received in
criminal law, namely in the interpretation of consent defenses for crimes such as burglary,
trespass, and rape. Id. at 1652-54.
175 Id. at 1658-59 (using an example of a pro-life network owner whose Terms of Use
agreement allows only those who express pro-life opinions to use the network, thus
exposing pro-choice users to criminal liability).
176 Bellia, supra note 114, at 2234. This is an application of her larger thesis that "property-
rule protection for network resources is more appropriate than scholars have thus far
recognized." Id. at 2170 (noting that the weight of scholarship supports liability rule).
Moreover, Bellia argues that "entitling a system owner to property-rule protection so long
as she provides the user with actual notice of permissible uses of the system or adopts a
system configuration making it plain to the user that access is restricted would better
balance the interests of consumers and system owners than rejecting property-rule
protection outright." Id. at 2164.
177 Id. at 2254. Professor Kerr relies was relying upon a conception of "authorization" to
supply a limiting principle, whereas Bellia would also finds an outer boundary in "access."
See supra notes 167-7o and accompanying text.
178 Id. at 2253-54.
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other records.179 If access without authorization "is to be read
consistently throughout the statute," Bellia argues, "then it must
extend only to breaches of these sorts of code-based limitations. '"18 0
Bellia draws additional support for a narrow reading from legislative
history, arguing that nothing indicates Congressional intent to extend
the statute's application to publicly available information.181
Other commentators have expressed reservations as to the
adoption of a code-based interpretation. One scholar has noted that
such an interpretation of unauthorized access is "flatly inconsistent
with the explicit language of [the CFAA], which makes a clear
distinction between unauthorized access' and 'access in excess of
authorization'," and "flatly inconsistent" with the post-1986 legislative
history of the statute. 82 Furthermore, policy rationale may also
caution against code-based interpretations. As Professor Winn argues,
the code-based interpretation artificially restricts the set of norms that
courts are permitted to consider to those prevalent among computer
programmers. 83 According to Winn, the fact that a code-based model
would yield inequitable results compounds this concern. Specifically,
"a homeowner who simply fails to secure a personal computer [via
code protections] should still be entitled to the protection of computer
179 Id. at 2254. Since the information is not publicly available, it is necessarily segregated
by code or placed on a system not generally accessible to the public. Id. But see Galbraith,
supra note 31, at 335 ("Despite the fact that the CFAA's legislative history suggests that the
statute is designed to protect confidential information, as opposed to all other types of
information, the statutory language is not so limited.").
180 Bellia, supra note 114, at 2254.
181 Id. at 2257. Rather, she notes, the legislative record continually stressed issues of
security and confidentiality. Id. Others, however, have found the statute's legislative
history ambiguous. Cf. Field, supra note 91, at 830 (reviewing legislative history and
finding that "because the legislative history contains independent support for [contract-,
agency-, and code-based interpretations], no single approach is justified on the grounds
that it represents the congressionally dictated interpretation of authorization."). Field goes
on to note, however, that taking a broader approach to the CFAA's legislative history
reveals a legislative aim to create liability for computer misuse, and a code-based approach
best approximates that aim. Id. at 835-37. Field adds that because Congress exhibited
evasiveness and ambiguity when dealing with the issue of insider authorization, it may
have intended to leave the question of authorization in employment situations for courts to
decide. Id. at 840-41.
182 Winn, supra note 3, at 1419.
183 Id. Winn calls this a system of "norms by nerds."
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trespass laws against an unwanted intrusion into his or her home
computer system."18 4
Beyond endorsing a particular interpretation of a key term, some
commentators have advanced legislative approaches to the problem
by advocating the repeal or revision of the CFAA's private cause of
action as a means to limit expansive interpretation of the statute.185
Finally, some commentators have compared the CFAA to
alternative means of protection. While some have argued that the
CFAA's goal of protecting information "has been, and continues to be,
fulfilled quite adequately by existing 'traditional' criminal statutes," 186
others have cited the broad and expansive nature of the CFAA as
justification to minimize the need for other additional protections
against electronic trespass.187
Distinctly lacking from the CFAA debate is a prolonged discussion
regarding the application of the statute in the employment context. 88
Commentators generally seem opposed to such an application,
particularly when employee intent governs the interpretation of
authorization. 189 The next part addresses the question: Which is a
184 Id. at 1420.
185 Brenton, supra note 51, at 457 (suggesting that Congress either amend the CFAA to
remove the subsection (a)(2)(C) from the ambit of the private right of action or add a
statutory definition of the term "authorization" that overturns the Shurgard/Citrin reading
of the statute); Galbraith, supra note 31, at 366-68 (arguing that because the CFAA was
meant to deter hackers, not to control access to, and use of, information on publicly
available websites, the statute should be amended to ensure such access and use without
statutory liability).
,86 Olivenbaum, supra note 23, at 624 (arguing that "[traditional criminal statutes] are
likely to be more effective vehicles for the prosecution of computer-related crimes," and
adding that "[s]tatutes that focus instead on the technical means by which a prohibited
result may be achieved tend to be unnecessary, imprecise, and quickly outstripped by
changing technology.").
187 Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1485, 1513-15 (2007) (arguing that the scope, statutory detail, and history of the CFAA
minimizes the need for cyberproperty to protect against electronic invasion).
188 The only scholarly commentary directly focused on this has been Field, supra note 91;
and Winn, supra note 3.
189 See Field, supra note 91, at 821, 825; Kerr, supra note 17, at 1596; Dan E. Lawrence,
Comment, Just Add Plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit's Recipe for Instant Liability Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 223, 243 (2006) (arguing that Citrin
has potential to extend liability to actors outside Congress's intended scope because it
resulted from the court's misunderstanding of the relevant technology involved). But see
Richard Warner, The Employer's New Weapon: Employee Liability Under the Computer
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more prudent basis for interpreting authorization, employer conduct
or employee intent?
V. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COUNTERVAILING INTERPRETATIONS
OF "AUTHORIZATION"
A. THE EMPLOYER'S CONDUCT OR THE EMPLOYEE'S INTENT
An employer's conduct approach certainly has appeal in that the
use of code and similar hard-line, technical barriers provides an easy
rule for courts to apply. Either an employee can physically access data,
or she cannot. Thus, code forms a binary proxy for authorization and
the basis of liability with few, if any, exceptions. This regime, however,
also has disadvantages.
The immediate appeal of an employee's intent approach is that it
captures all of the wrongful accessers.190 The appeal of this approach
is well-framed in the inverse: Simply stated, "[w]hy should an
employee who oversteps the bounds of his or her permission to
transfer sensitive information to a third party, or the third party that
receives such information, not be liable?"'19 It is no easy feat to
vindicate an IRS employee who uses the IRS system in violation of
strict confidentiality restrictions to obtain the tax returns of his
political enemies, their family members, a former girlfriend, and a
prosecutor charging his father with an unrelated felony.192 Similarly,
should an account manager at a trusted firm escape liability under the
CFAA when she provides co-conspirators with her client's confidential
account information in order to transact fraudulent purchases? 193
Without some consideration of the employee's intent, these rogue
employees would escape the reach of the CFAA.
Fraud and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 11, 27-28 (2008) (supporting an
agency-based approach).
190 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1669, 1675 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
191 See Warner, supra note 189, at 28.
192 United States v. Czubinski, io6 F.3d 1o69 (1st Cir. 1997). Although the employee
..unquestionably exceeded authorized access," his misuse did not satisfy the statutory
requirement that he obtain "anything of value." Id. at 1078.
193 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that she should not).
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B. IMPLEMENTATION COSTS AND GAINS
An employer's conduct approach carries with it high infrastructure
costs that will probably be passed on to end-users. Code technology
must be acquired, installed, updated, and maintained. Total economic
costs probably exceed actual financial costs. This is because code or
similar technical barriers necessarily slow the pace of operations, as
employees must regularly enter passwords to access the data needed
for work-related functions, thus incurring opportunity costs. Although
a central administrator could be charged with this function, this
simply shifts this burden rather than eliminating it. Therefore, a legal
regime based upon an employer's conduct entails costs beyond that of
the technology itself, and such costs may neither be explicit nor easily
quantifiable. Despite these concerns, a legal rule that leads to
increased expenses should not be eschewed solely on that basis. It is
perhaps more prudent to ask who would play the role of the cheapest
cost avoider.194 Under such a framework, the burden should fall upon
the employee, who knows-and controls-when he will cause harm, as
opposed to the employer, who, unaware of how or when an employee
may cause harm, must protect against all possible vulnerabilities. 195
The asymmetry of information present in the employment
relationship,96 is exacerbated in this particular context because the
costs to the employer of bad bargaining are far greater than those
conventionally associated with contracting for employment (i.e.,
malicious intent potentially imposing high economic costs as opposed
to poor work quality and/or ethic). Monitoring, which is costly on its
194 This concept was expounded in Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and
Economic Analysis (1970).
195 But see Brenton, supra note 51, at 461 (arguing that because the employer is in the best
position to determine who should have access to his company's systems, he should bear the
burden of determining who has authorized access for the purpose of the statute). Brenton's
argument fails to consider the fact that the ability to determine who should have access for
work-related functions is different from the ability to determine who may abuse that
access, how they may do so, and when.
196 See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1957-59
(1996) ("An employee and employer contracting for employment fits [a market for lemons]
model: each possesses unique access to information-information regarding the quality of
their offers-that the other party would find highly relevant, but which neither party can
easily discover from the other."); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1924
(1996).
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face, 197 seems less effective in the context of a rogue employee than
with a shoddy worker.198 In the seemingly analogous context of
intentional torts, Judge Posner has shown further cause to quell doubt
that the employee is the cheapest cost avoider in this context: The
rogue employee, like the intentional tortfeasor, should be deemed the
cheapest cost avoider because his cost of avoiding damage or loss to
his employer is negative.199 Rather, he must expend resources in order
to carry out his malicious plans. In this sense, his cost of avoidance is
less than that of his employer, who instead must incur positive costs
to thwart the efforts of any and all potentially rogue employees.200
Additionally, as a practical matter, the employer's conduct
approach simply does not solve the problem of rogue employees. As
one court noted:
While passwords and other electronic means can limit
the unauthorized dissemination of some confidential
information, an employee who has not yet announced
his departure is still able to access confidential
information and store it on a CD or floppy disk before
he or she leaves . . [and/or] quickly transmit
information out of the company via e-mail.21
Even if an employer has put in place a robust system of code-based
access and has demarcated each employee's access to that data
necessary for him to fulfill his work-related responsibilities, the
197 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 196, at 1924 ("Firms can learn by monitoring, but
constant monitoring is very costly. To save on costs, firms infrequently monitor workers.").
198 Presumably, a worker cannot hide shoddy work product longer than he can disguise
malicious intent, as one is more readily detectable than the other.
199 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW 149-
6o (1987). This description is adopted from Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in
Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL L.
REV. 1181, 1197-1199 (1994).
200 Landes & Posner, supra note 199, at 149-6o.
201 Pacific Aerospace & Electronics, Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash.
2003). This loophole would presumably diminish the deterrent power of computer crime
law in the employment context. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207-08 (1968) (arguing that a rational criminal would
violate the law when his expected gain from violating a criminal statute would exceed the
expected penalty).
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employer still cannot protect against an employee misappropriating
accessible data. In Continental Group, Inc. v. KW Property
Management, L.L.C., for instance, the court observed that although
an employer's computer system had tiered levels of access governed
by employees' use of usernames and passwords, the defendant
employee's access level was high enough to be able to access all the
files she was accused of misappropriating.202
A code-based or similar approach draws lines in the wrong places
and puts the burden on employers to predict the necessary questions
of who, when, what, and how. The result is a legal framework as
superfluous as the technical framework to which it attaches. The
resulting legal regime doctrinally assumes that one who is given a key
can do no harm to that which he is granted access. Such an
assumption is clearly out of touch with the issues encountered in the
aforementioned cases, and with current issues in the employment
relationship.203 Without some focus on the employee's intent, the
employer's conduct approach seems to place an impossible burden on
employers, and inappropriately tilts the balance in the employee's
favor.
The employer's intent approach avoids the incurrence of
inefficient infrastructure expenses lacking attendant gains. Compared
to the employer, the rogue employee is the cheaper cost avoider. This
is because the expenditure of technological security measures creates
numerous costs, including the technology itself, as well as the
slowdown in the pace of workflow that would result from
technological barriers. An interpretation of authorization focusing on
employee's intent would be cheaper because the legal framework
would itself provide adequate protection without the need for an
additional trigger mechanism (e.g., an unpermitted code bypass).
There is no reason to suspect that agency costs, such as monitoring,
bonding, and residual costs, would exceed those already present in the
employment relationship. °24
202 622 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1372-73 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
203 See supra Part II, Subpart A.
204 "Monitoring costs" are costs that employers (principals) expend to ensure employee
(agent) loyalty. "Bonding costs" are costs that employees expend to ensure employers of
their reliability. "Residual costs" are costs arising from differences of interest that remain
after monitoring and bonding costs are incurred. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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C. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The statutory structure and legislative history favor an employee's
intent approach. An employer's conduct approach is inconsistent with
the statutory structure of the CFAA, specifically with the statute's
dichotomy of access violations. It is difficult to envision how any
technical framework an employer can implement may differentiate
between violations arising from lack of any authorization (i.e.,
"without authorization") and violations arising from insufficient
authorization (i.e., "exceeding authorized access"). Either an employee
has breached a code barrier, or she has not. Because any bypass of a
technical barrier would need to be deemed access without
authorization, the two degrees of violation would be rendered
superfluous. It is a well-settled canon of statutory construction to
avoid such a result.205 The most plausible explanation for this
dichotomy under an employer's conduct approach would be that all
employee-related violations of the CFAA fall within the latter category
because employees are initially granted at least some access. However,
such an approach removes the Citrin fact pattern from the employer's
remedies because subsection 103o(a)(5) does not include a provision
for exceeding authorized access. Thus, an employee would not face
liability under the CFAA if, prior to quitting and joining a competitor,
she intentionally deleted sensitive data on her employer's computer
system. It is difficult to accept such an approach because subsection
1o3o(a)(5) violations seem to be the most culpable. Deleting sensitive
data, and thus depriving the employer of it, is worse than copying that
data because value is impermissibly destroyed as opposed to
impermissibly transferred. In the former instance, it would be absurd
to argue that the employee lacked reason to believe that what he was
doing was forbidden.
Although the employee's intent approach also faces conceptual
challenges in light of the statutory distinction between access without
authorization and access in excess of authorization, the notion of
exceeding access may be viewed as a means of prohibiting improper
use. For instance, an employee may have access to view her client's
credit card information but may exceed that access when she does so
in furtherance of an identity theft scheme. This control on intended
use is unnecessary in regard to the subsection lO3o(a)(5) violations
because there is no intended way to destroy an employer's sensitive
205 See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 5o6 (2000) (recognizing that "terms in a statute
should not be construed so as to render any provision of that statute meaningless or
superfluous.").
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resources. Some courts have opposed this reasoning, noting that an
employee's intent approach conflates unauthorized access with
unauthorized use, which is not prohibited on the face of the statute.2o6
However, these courts have neglected to observe that an
interpretation of authorization focused on the employer's conduct,
which they endorse, conflates authority with ability, a conceptual leap.
Furthermore, under an employer's conduct approach it is difficult to
separate authority and access because, under such an approach, if an
employee is given access, she has authority. Thus, an employee
violates the CFAA if she accesses without access. This conflation is
particularly egregious considering the fact that any construction of the
statute depends on these terms conveying distinct meanings.
Nevertheless, the employee's intent approach is undermined by the
fact that the 1986 amendments revised the statutory text to remove
from the statute's ambit circumstances in which an employee's access
is legitimate in some instances but criminal in other (not clearly
distinguishable) instances.207 This, however, is the only piece of
legislative history distancing congressional intent from an employee's
intent approach.20 8 Subsequent amendments and general themes of
the legislative history favor an employee's intent approach.
An employer's conduct approach is also inconsistent with the
CFAA's legislative history. As others have concluded, the legislative
history provides few hints as to which interpretation of authorization
was intended.209 Reviewing the legislative history contextually,
however, Katherine Mesenbring Field notes that "[b]ecause code
serves as the primary constraint on behavior.., circumventing code
protections must be categorized as the misuse of a computer," which
is what the CFAA was originally conceived to address.210 However,
206 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
208 It is curious that other important pieces of legislation have uniquely adapted
themselves to the nascent field of employment law. For instance, although the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, was aimed at private
employer pension plans with little explicit attention to health plans, over time the statute
was used to preempt an increasing number of state regulations affecting employment-
based health plans, without any effort by Congress to overrule such interpretations. See
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 495-501 (6th ed. 2007).
20 9 See Field, supra note 91, at 829-34; supra note 181 and accompanying text.
210 See Field, supra note 91, at 834-38. Computer misuse stands in opposition to
traditional crimes using computers. Id.; Kerr, supra note 17, at 1602-05.
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although originally designed to punish and deter hackers, the CFAA
has been robustly expanded since its original enactment in 1984.211
These expansions were accompanied with congressional prerogative
to paint with a broad stroke. Senator Patrick Leahy, chair of the
subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Committee on the
Judiciary, for instance, acknowledged this when he remarked:
On the day we pass a law, we are, in effect, taking a
snapshot of what we know that day. But however we
draw it, somebody is going to sit down and say, well,
look, I am just going to create a variation not covered
by the statute. I am not sure all of us, putting our best
minds together, could come up with every variation on
a law that might get enacted some time this year to
cover some new variation next year. 212
Senator Leahy's remarks clearly suggest that the CFAA should be
construed broadly to accommodate new varieties of computer-related
crime and compensate for Congress's inability to predict them.213 This
211 Lawrence, supra note 189, at 239 ("There seems to be a congressional mandate that
courts interpret the CFAA broadly."); see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
212 Lawrence, supra note 189, at 239 n.144 (citing The Impact of Computer Viruses and
Other Forms of Computer Sabotage or Exploitation on Computer Information Systems and
Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, olst Cong. 12 (1989) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)). Furthermore, this
reasoning is neither unique nor exclusive to the cybercrime context. See SEC v. Edwards,
540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) ("[The definition of an investment contract] 'embodies a flexible
rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise
of profits."') (quoting SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)). Indeed, in regulating the
securities market, Congress "painted with a broad brush" and defined the term "security"
in "sufficiently broad and general terms[.]" Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 6o-61
(1990).
213 Id.; see also U.S. v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (2005) ("[A]lthough legislators may not
know about [a particular computer-based radio networking system], they do know that
complexity is endemic in the modern world and that each passing year sees new
developments. That's why they write general statutes rather than enacting a list of
particular forbidden acts. And it is the statutes they enacted-not the thoughts they did or
didn't have-that courts must apply.") (emphasis in original); Decker, supra note 35, at
1011, 1015-16 ("As computers continue to evolve in their methods of creation and storage of
valuable information, Congress must again modernize the criminal provisions to protect
this irreplaceable commodity[.] The Internet is constantly shape shifting, and it is
impossible to foresee the nature and scope of all of the opportunities now and in the future
for cyber criminals.").
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should entail a focus not upon what an employer has done to prevent
unauthorized access, but on what the employee seeks to achieve by his
actions. Thus, a code-based approach imprudently confines the
CFAA's protection within formalistic barriers and puts the burden on
employers to continually erect these barriers to renew their statutory
protection.
The legislative history of the CFAA supports the claim that
Congress designed the statute broadly with the intention that it be
sufficiently malleable to address new, emerging threats that arise
through the improper use of a computer. Such flexibility is consistent
with the approach Congress took in enacting a single statute to
address the problem of computer misuse. Thus, as with the mail and
wire fraud statutes upon which the CFAA was modeled,214 it is prudent
and legally sound to use the CFAA as a first line of defense to address
new forms of serious crime that do not fall within more specific
legislation.215 Although the threat of computer hackers was a
significant concern in 1984 (when the statute was enacted), today
there is reason to suspect that the threat posed by hackers has been
overstated.216 On the contrary, employee sabotage and disloyalty is a
new, serious crime that leaves employers vulnerable to those who have
the greatest access, knowledge of operations, and ability to do harm.
Not only do alternative remedies not provide sufficient protection,217
214 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
215 United States v. Czubinski, 1o6 F.3d 1O69, 1079 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("When a 'new' fraud
develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal
on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be
developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.")).
216 Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1327, 1331 (2008) (arguing that there is unwarranted focus on hackers and looking to
the unauthorized computer access controversy as one area where rhetoric has driven policy
despite lack of empirical evidence); Reid Skibell, The Myth of the Computer Hacker, 5
INFO. COMM. & SOC'Y 336, 347-53 (2002) (explaining that the hacker threat is inflated,
arising from, among other things, the film WarGames, and noting that "insiders are a far
greater threat than external attacks.").
217 See Diamond Power Int'l v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322,1334-35 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(employer not afforded trade secret protection-or CFAA claim-against former employee
who misappropriated for the benefit of a rival employer an extensive list of approximately
35,000 parts and raw materials used to produce his current employer's products, despite
the existence of a confidentiality agreement, password protection, and physical security
measures); Mercer Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. Wilde, 920 F. Supp. 219, 235 (D.D.C. 1996)
(employer denied breach of fiduciary duty claim when former senior employees mailed
diskettes containing prior work to two major clients in order to increase clients' comfort
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Congress specifically intended legal overlap.218  Adopting an
interpretation of authorization that is tied to existing technology
would do precisely that which Congress has cautioned against-
anchoring the CFAA to current technology when technology is
consistently developing.219
D. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS
A regime based on employer conduct lacks a proper doctrinal basis
for liability. Professor Kerr supports his proposal for a code-based
interpretation by arguing that criminalizing circumvention of code
tracks the traditional treatment of consent defenses in criminal law .220
He notes, "the computer is 'tricked' into authorizing the defendant to
access the computer, in a way conceptually similar to how a
homeowner might be tricked into allowing a person into their home or
a victim might be tricked into consenting to a request to engage in
sexual activity. '"221 He further draws a distinction between fraud in the
inducement, which does not legally invalidate consent and resembles
contract-based restrictions, and fraud in the factum, which invalidates
consent and resembles a code-based restriction.222 This makes sense if
the CFAA is viewed as a statute seeking to criminalize traditional
crimes using a computer. However, the CFAA is better viewed as a
statutory response to crimes of computer misuse.223 This legislative
aim ventures into the terrain of cyberproperty and the notion that
"code is law," a concept popularized by Professor Lessig which posits
level in switching their business from employer to a competing firm the former employees
joined).
218 S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996) ("[W]here the information stolen is also copyrighted,
the theft may implicate certain rights under the copyright laws.").
219See Olivenbaum, supra note 23, at 624 ("Statutes that focus.., on the technical means
by which a prohibited result may be achieved tend to be unnecessary, imprecise, and
quickly outstripped by changing technology."); see also supra notes 212-13 and
accompanying text.
220 Kerr, supra note 17, at 1652 (citing examples of trespass, burglary, rape, and sexual
assault).
221 d. at 1654.
222 Id. at 1652-56.
223M[d. at 1602; Field, supra note 91, at 836. For an overview of the distinction, see supra
note 24.
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that computer code may be understood as either equivalent to, or
interchangeable with, the power of law.224 The normative appeal of
this proposition, however, is at least questionable. If accepted, the
competing sovereignty of code recognized under this theory would
threaten to undermine the rule of law.225 According to Professor
Lastowka, when faced with new technologies such as network
exclusion, the law can provide several different responses. It might
offer legal alternatives to the power of exclusion, legally prohibit
technological exclusion, or ignore the new technology altogether.226
He provides the following example:
Cars, for instance, are not laws. Car ownership gives
the owner the technological ability to drive quickly and
endanger the lives of others. However, the law
intrudes, to curb the right to exercise technological
power (via speed limits), to regulate who can exercise
that power (by licensing), and to provide special civil
penalties for failing to follow social directives regarding
the use of the power (e.g. driving while intoxicated).227
An interpretation of authorization that permits an employer's use of
code to supplant law provides a questionable doctrinal foundation
upon which to govern the employment relationship. At the very least,
some mix of legal and technological exclusion rules is more
appropriate.22 8
An employee's intent approach to interpreting authorization
avoids the messy intermingling between technology and law. Rather,
an employee's intent approach-particularly the Citrin/Shurgard
interpretation-unites the CFAA with agency law doctrine, which
224 Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REv. 23, 24 (2007). Professor
Lessig elaborated on his theory in LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999).
225 See Lastowka, supra note 224, at 58 n.216 (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the
Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501, 543 (1999) ("Code writers can
write code that displaces the values that law has embraced. And if the values of law are to
survive, law might well have to respond.")).
226 Id. at 60.
2 2 7 Id.
228 Id.
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governs the employer-employee relationship, and also contract law,
which similarly plays a key role in the relationship. All employees are
agents of their employer (the principal), in accord with the definition
of employee in section 7.07 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
(2006).229 Thus, this interpretation provides a well-settled doctrinal
foundation to the concept of authorization.
E. THE RULE OF LENITY
Although some commentators have argued that an employee's
intent approach serves to criminalize the law of contract when the use
of a computer is involved,230 under proper circumstances a breach of
contract can constitute a crime.231 Moreover, agency law principles are
not divorced from the criminal context.2 32 In fact, some crimes require
a breach of fiduciary duty in order to trigger criminal liability. 233 Thus,
some courts have reasoned imprudently that the rule of lenity
forecloses consideration of employee's intent as the proxy for
authorization within the meaning of the CFAA. The Supreme Court
229 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT § 1.O1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2oo8).
230 See Brett Senior & Assoc. v. Fitzgerald, 26 I.E.R. Cases 674, 677-78 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(employee's breach of a confidentiality agreement); Kerr, supra note 17, at 160o.
231 For instance, an employee who steals trade secrets, breaching a confidentiality
agreement, can also be guilty of violating the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. See
Akerman, supra note 4; Lorin L. Reisner, Transforming Trade Secret Theft Violations into
Federal Crimes: The Economic Espionage Act, 15 TOURO L. REv. 139, 139 (1998).
232 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987) (citing RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY to support conviction of journalist who divulged prepublication confidential
information of employer in violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes); United States v.
Galindo, 871 F.2d 99, lO (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that although defendant was entitled to
receive mail on account of employee status, her taking mail with intent to steal ended
agency relationship and she was guilty of theft even though she converted mail to her own
use thereafter); United States v. Hill, 579 F.2d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that if
defendant intended to convert a check when he removed principal's mail, his agency
terminated).
233 Insider trading law has been construed in accordance with agency law principles. See
A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the
Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REv. 13 (1998) (arguing that United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997) establishes a foundation for insider trading based on agency
principles). Pritchard favors agency law over the classical theory of insider trading, which
draws heavily on the law of deceit because "[a]gency law provides a more comprehensive
and coherent basis for dealing with the problem of insider trading, which is, at bottom, the
misuse by faithless agents of information that belongs to others." Id. at 17.
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has increasingly watered down its formulation of the lenity rule,
applying it only in the face of "grievous ambiguity," or only if "after
seizing everything from which aid can be derived," the Court can make
"no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. '"234 In reality,
"[t]he simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not
sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are
ambiguous to some degree. '"235 Rather, lenity should be reserved for
situations in which "a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's
intended scope even after resort to 'the language and structure,
legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute."236
Considering Congress's apparent desire to affect a broad sweep with
the CFAA, the rule of lenity seems to offer a less instructive tool.
Moreover, disregarding the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, it
is difficult to bring the common rogue employee fact pattern within
the ambit of the rule of lenity because the employee who breaches an
explicit agreement or who violates clear terms of service was given fair
warning that the conduct she engaged in was forbidden.237 A
counterargument should focus only on the extent of repercussions,
not whether punishment is warranted.
F. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
Professor Kerr's scholarship has drawn attention to two
constitutional problems that may emerge from the application of an
employee's intent theory of authorization.238 First, a contract-based
234 Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2420, 2423-24 (2006) (collecting
cases).
235 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998) (holding that the phrase "carries a
firearm" as used in a criminal statute is not limited to the carrying of firearms on one's
person, but also applies to possessing of firearms in one's vehicle).
236 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, io8 (199o) (emphasis in original).
237 In United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2010) for instance, the Fifth
Circuit rejected a lenity argument, reasoning that interpreting the CFAA in accordance
with an employee's intent approach would not be "unexpected" because "[a]n authorized
computer user 'has reason to know' that he or she is not authorized to access data or
information in furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme." Although John presents an
extreme case (misappropriating customer account information in order to incur fraudulent
charges), it is difficult to argue that an explicit employment agreement, for instance,
provides any less "reason to know" something is impermissible than does a criminal
statute.
238 Kerr, supra note 17; Kerr, supra note 3.
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interpretation of authorization may permit a network owner to
"harness the criminal law at his discretion," thus creating overbreadth
concerns arising from the unilateral power to control authorization.239
As Professor Winn argues, however, there is reason to believe that
such fears are premised on a misunderstanding of trespass doctrine,
which has never given owners the arbitrary power to determine what
access to their property is authorized.24° Rather, "[wihere the use of
an ostensibly private resource serves a socially beneficial purpose with
little harm to the interests of the property owner, the common law
recognizes exceptions to the general principle of the requirement of
permission.241 Thus, conceptualizing the CFAA as a statute
concerning digital trespass (an understanding that runs in accord with
congressional intent),242 and applying well-settled doctrinal principles
to its scope,243 should eliminate, or at least dramatically temper,
problems relating to overbreadth.
Second, Kerr argues that an agency-based interpretation of
authorization is susceptible to void-for-vagueness arguments. 44 In
other CFAA contexts, however, this argument has failed to persuade
most of the courts that have considered it.245 In United States v.
Mitra, for instance, the defendant contended that the CFAA was not
239 Kerr, supra note 17, at 1658. Kerr provides the example of a student conducting
research on the Ku Klux Klan who accesses a KKK website by clicking "I Agree" to a terms
of use agreement conditioning authorization to access the site on adherence to racist
beliefs. Id. at 1622-23.
240 Winn, supra note 3, at 1422.
241 Id. at 1422-23 (noting further that "the severity of the common law of trespass is
constantly lessened by privileges, licenses and immunities as a matter of law to protect
reasonable public use of the ostensibly private resource"); see, e.g., New Jersey v. Shack,
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
242 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
243 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1O66, 1072 (2003) (citing Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S.
494, 500-01 (2000) for the proposition that federal statutes are to be interpreted in light of
the common law, and looking to the common law of trespass to guide its interpretation of
the Stored Communications Act).
244 Kerr, supra note 3, at 1583-87.
245 Most courts confronted with the vagueness argument have rejected it. See United States
v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Powers, 2010 WL 1418172, at
*4 (D. Neb. Mar. 4, 2010); United States v. Kernell, 2010 WL 1543847, at *3-*7 (E. D.
Tenn. Apr. 7, 201o), affd in part, rev'd in part, 2010 WL 1544281 (E. D. Tenn. Apr. 19,
201o). But see United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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meant to target his interference with a computer-based radio
system.246 Judge Easterbrook rejected his vagueness argument,
reasoning that the defendant's problem is "not that [the CFAA] has
been turned in a direction that would have surprised reasonable
people; it is that a broad statute has been applied exactly as written,
while he wishes that it had not been."247 Although no court seems to
have directly encountered a vagueness challenge to an agency-based
interpretation of authorization applied in the context of a rogue
employee case, there is no reason to suspect such challenges will fare
better than previous vagueness challenges to the CFAA. Congress had
employees in its sights when it enacted the CFAA, 248 and it sought a
broad evolution of the statute to address new challenges that may
arise in the future.249 Accordingly, a broad interpretation of
authorization is consistent with the statute's purpose and purview,
and should not be deemed unconstitutional on vagueness grounds.250
246 Mitra, 405 F.3d at 496. When summarizing the crux of his argument, the court noted
that, in contrast to an ex-employee erasing data on his employer's system, Congress could
not have intended for Mitra's conduct to constitute a violation of the CFAA. Id. at 495
(citing United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2001)).
247 Id. ("There is no constitutional obstacle to enforcing broad but clear statutes[.] The
statute itself gives all the notice that the Constitution requires.") (emphasis in original); see
also United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting vagueness
challenges and noting that "[a]lthough the text of the statute does not specify whether the
term 'electronic communication' includes communications in electronic storage, the
legislative history of the [Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986] indicates that
Congress intended the term to be defined broadly.").
248 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 56-57, 212-13, 219 and accompanying text; see also Mitra, 405 F.3d at
495 ("Section 1030 is general. [Statutory] [e]xclusions show just how general[.] As more
devices come to have built-in intelligence, the effective scope of the statute grows. This
might prompt Congress to amend the statute but does not authorize the judiciary to give
the existing version less coverage than its language portends.") (emphasis in original);
Winn, supra note 3, at 1435 ("When courts have interpreted the broad statutory language
in the CFAA in ways Congress has determined to be inconsistent with public policy, it has
quickly taken steps to limit those decisions with specific language.").
250 See Akerman, supra note 4 (noting that although the wire fraud statute could be used
to prosecute a student who calls home interstate asking his parents for school money when
he instead intends to use it to buy alcohol, this potential for misuse of prosecutorial
discretion has not prompted anyone to seriously argue that the statute is unconstitutional).
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G. DOWNSIDE PROTECTION
Potential problems arising from an employee's intent
interpretation are less severe than those caused by an employer's
conduct approach.
At least one commentator has expressed concern that an agency-
based approach creates potential for judicial manipulability and
"disparate outcomes" because agency principles leave room for
judicial discretion.251 This argument proves too much. The common
law itself may be characterized as a legal regime that specifically
contemplates a role for judge-made rules. Within this regime, a
flexible legal rule should be preferred in an area characterized by
rapid development of technology, such as the law of computer
network integrity. As Professor Richard A. Epstein has noted, "new
forms of technology create the opportunity for new forms of resource
use.... A common law system that is able to work itself pure should
be able to respond to these changes both by preserving what makes
sense in the older system and by changing what does not."252 Implicit
fairness consideration253 and the safeguard of appellate review
further ease reservations as to the prudence of judicial discretion in
this area.
Adopting an employee's intent approach also would not be a
venture into uncharted legal terrain. Jurisdictions outside the U.S.
have found merit in an interpretation of authorization focusing on
employee's intent. Courts in the United Kingdom, Australia, and
251 Field, supra note 91, at 844-45.
252 Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73-74 (2003).
253 Cf. Wong, supra note 166, at 127 (discussing cyberproperty cases and noting that "it is
possible to view the courts' actions, simply, as doing the right thing once the plaintiff
presents a convincing case that her interests are in need of a legal remedy."). In Shurgard
and EF Cultural, although the employers had the power to restrict the employees, access,
they lacked reason to suspect that such actions were necessary. The employees were still
employed by their respective firms when the violations occurred. For Shurgard, see supra
notes 67-78 and accompanying text. For EF Cultural, see supra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text. The Brekka opinion, by contrast, suggested that the employment
relationship differed from that of a conventional one and LVRC was in a better position to
safeguard its interests than similarly situated employers. See supra notes 116-27 and
accompanying text. This argument suggests that CFAA cases may be best understood
through a standards- rather than rules-based framework. Thus, the governing legal metric
is an ex post, rather than ex ante, assessment of the actor's conduct. For a useful overview
of the distinction between rules and standards, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 1o6 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-59 (1992).
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Singapore, for instance, have looked to a user's intent to determine
whether her access lacks authorization.254
VI. CONCLUSION
Employers should be afforded broad safeguards under the CFAA.
An interpretation of authorization that focuses upon employee's intent
is the better approach to achieve these ends. The implementation of
this goal is probably best achieved through legislative amendment to
the CFAA. 255 In particular, section 1030(e) should be amended to add
a definition to the term "authorization." This definition should be
structured in such a way so as to conform to the employee's intent
interpretation. Additionally, because Congress's attempts to define the
difference between insider and outsider violations have proven
unworkable, the distinction between access "without authorization"
and access "exceeding authorization" should be omitted from the
statute. The statute should only prohibit access without authorization.
Thus, congressional intent to apply the CFAA to insiders, such as
employees, would be preserved, though it would no longer be spelled
out on the face of the statute. Jurisdictions outside the United States
have enacted statutes identical to the CFAA without expressly
including offenses that depend upon a person having exceeded their
authority. These jurisdictions have prosecuted insiders using general
statutory proscriptions against accessing without authorization.25 6
Because this alteration of the CFAA is an amendment of the statute's
actual language and structure, it cannot be achieved through judicial
rule. Legislative amendment will better alleviate any concerns
regarding the rule of lenity and vagueness because any ambiguity will
be definitely resolved and fair warning will be provided to potentially
rogue employees.
254 See Winn, supra note 3, at 1409-10 (discussing the United Kingdom and Australia);
Wong, supra note 162, at 119-22 (discussing the United Kingdom and Singapore).
255 Alternatively, the Supreme Court could weigh in on the issue and thus resolve the
circuit split. However, statutory amendment seems the more prudent approach.
256 See Wong, supra note 166, at 121-22.
1Vol 7:2
